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Abstract
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder
may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and
profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we
determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained
auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that
in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies
in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than
symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only
by a linear factor.
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen the emergence of the Internet as a platform of multifaceted economic
interaction, from the technical level of computer communication, routing, storage, and com-
puting, to the level of electronic commerce in its many forms. Studying such interactions
raises new questions in economics that have to do with the necessity of taking computa-
tional considerations into account. This paper deals with one such question: how to design
auctions optimally when we are restricted to use a very small amount of communication.
This paper studies the effect of severely restricting the amount of communication allowed
in a single-item auction. Each bidder privately knows his real-valued willingness to pay for
the item, but is only allowed to send k possible messages to the auctioneer, who must
then allocate the item and determine the price on the basis of the messages received. (For
example, a bidder may only be able to send t bits of information, in which case k = 2t). The
simplest case is k = 2, i.e., each bidder sends a single bit of information. This is in contrast
to the usual auction design formulation, in which bidders communicate real numbers.
While communicating a real number may not seem excessively burdensome, there are
several motivations for studying auctions with such severe restrictions on the communica-
tion. First, if auctions are to be used for allocating low-level computing resources, they
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should use only a very small amount of computational effort. For example, an auction for
routing a single packet on the Internet must require very little communication overhead,
certainly not a whole real number. Ideally, one would like to “waste” only a bit or two on the
bidding information, perhaps “piggy-backing” on some unused bits in the packet header of
existing networking protocols (such as IP or TCP). Second, the amount of communication
also measures the extent of information revelation by the bidders. Usually, bidders will be
reluctant to reveal their exact private data (e.g., Rothkopf, Teisberg, & Kahn, 1990). This
work studies the tradeoff between the amount of revealed data and the optimality of the
auctions. We show that auctions can be close to optimal even using a single Yes/No ques-
tion per each bidder. Our results can also be applied to various environments where there
is a need for discretize the bidding procedure; one example is determining the optimal bid
increment in English auctions (Harstad & Rothkopf, 1994). Finally, a restriction on com-
munication may sometimes be viewed as a proxy for other simplicity considerations, such
as simple user interface or small number of possible payments to facilitate their electronic
handling. A recent paper (Blumrosen & Feldman, 2006) shows that the ideas illustrated
in this work extend to general mechanism-design frameworks where the requirement for a
small number of “actions” per each player are natural and intuitive.
We examine the effect of severe communication bounds on both the problem of maxi-
mizing social welfare and that of maximizing the seller’s expected profits (the latter under
the restrictions of Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality of
the bidders, and under a standard regularity condition on the distribution of bidders’ val-
uations). We study both simultaneous mechanisms, in which the bidders send their bids
without observing any actions of the other bidders, and sequential mechanisms where mes-
sages may depend on previous messages. We find that single-item auctions may be very
close to fully optimal despite the severe communication constraints. This is in contrast to
combinatorial auctions, in which exact or even approximate efficiency is known to require
an exponential amount of communication in the number of goods (Nisan & Segal, 2006).1
Both for welfare maximization and revenue maximization, we show that the optimal
2-bidder auction takes the simple form of a ”priority game” in which the player with the
highest bid wins, but ties are broken asymmetrically among the players (i.e., some players
have a pre-defined priority over the others when they send the same message). We show
how to derive the optimal values for the parameters of the priority game. These optimal
mechanisms are asymmetric by definition, although the players are a priori identical. The
asymmetry is in contrast with optimal mechanisms with unconstrained communication,
where symmetric mechanisms achieve optimal welfare (the second-price auction, Vickrey,
1961) and optimal profit (the Myerson auction, Myerson, 1981, for symmetric bidders).
Furthermore, we show that for any number of players, as the allowed number of messages
grows, the loss due to bounded communication is in order of O( 1
k2
). The bound is tight
for some distributions of valuations (e.g., for the uniform distribution). In addition, we
consider the case in which the number of players grows while each player has exactly two
1. There have been several other studies considering various computational considerations in auction de-
sign: timing (e.g., Lavi & Nisan, 2004; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002), unbounded supply (e.g., Feigenbaum,
Papadimitriou, & Shenker, 2001; Goldberg, Hartline, &Wright, 2001; Bar-Yossef, Hildrum, & Wu, 2002),
computational complexity in combinatorial auctions (see the survey by Cramton, Shoham, & Steinberg,
2006) and more.
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possible messages. We show that priority games are optimal for this case as well, and we
also characterize the parameters for the optimal mechanisms and show that they can be
generated from a simple recursive formula. We offer an asymptotic bound on the welfare
and profit losses due to bounded communication as the number of players grows (it is O( 1
n
)
for the uniform distribution). All the optimal mechanisms in this paper are deterministic,
but they are optimal even if the auctioneer is allowed to randomize.2
Our analysis implies some expected as well as some unexpected results:
• Low welfare and profit loss: Even severe bounds on communication result in
only a mild loss of efficiency. We present mechanisms in which the welfare loss and
the profit loss decrease exponentially in the number of the communication bits (and
quadratically in the number k of the allowed bids). For example, with two bidders
whose valuations are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the optimal 1-bit auction brings
expected welfare 0.648, compared to the first-best expected welfare 0.667.
• Asymmetry helps: Asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones with the
same communication bounds. For example, with two bidders whose valuations are
uniformly distributed in [0, 1], symmetric 1-bit auctions only achieve expected welfare
of 0.625, compared to 0.648 for asymmetric ones. We prove that both welfare- and
profit-maximizing auctions must be discriminatory in both allocation and payments.
• Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility is achieved at no additional
cost: The auctions we design have dominant-strategy equilibria and are ex-post indi-
vidually rational3, yet are optimal even without any incentive constraints (for welfare
maximization), or among all Bayesian-Nash incentive-compatible and interim individ-
ually rational auctions (for profit maximization). This generalizes well-known results
for the case without any communication constraints.
• Bidding using “mutually-centered” thresholds is optimal: We show that in the
optimal auctions with k messages, bidders simply partition the range of valuations into
k interval ranges and announce their interval. In 2-bidder mechanisms, each threshold
will have the interesting property of being the average value of the other bidder in the
respective interval. We denote such threshold vectors as “mutually centered”.
• Sequential mechanisms can do better, but only up to a linear factor: Al-
lowing players to send messages sequentially rather than simultaneously can achieve
a higher payoff than in simultaneous mechanisms. However, the payoff in any such
multi-round mechanism among n players can be achieved by a simultaneous mecha-
nism in which the players send messages which are longer only by a factor of n. This
result is surprising in light of the fact that in general the restriction to simultaneous
communication can increase communication complexity exponentially. Our results
2. The mechanisms are optimal even when the auctions are run repeatedly, as long as the bidders’ values
are uncorrelated over time.
3. A mechanism is ex-post individually rational if a player never pays more than her value. Interim indi-
vidual rationality is a weaker property, in which a player will not pay more than his value on average.
Individual rationality constraints are essential for the study of revenue maximization (otherwise, the
potential revenue is unbounded).
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for sequential mechanisms are very robust in several aspects. They allow the players
to send messages of various sizes and in any order, and they allow the auctioneer to
adaptively determine the order and the size of the messages based on the history of
the messages. The auctioneer may also use randomized decisions.
Although the welfare-maximizing mechanisms are asymmetric, symmetric mechanisms
can also be close to optimal: we show that as the number k of possible messages grows,
while the number of players is fixed, the loss in optimal symmetric mechanisms converges
to zero at the same rate as the loss in efficient “priority games”. The optimal loss in
symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms, however, differs by a constant factor. On the other
hand, when we fix the number of messages, we show that the optimal loss in asymmetric
mechanisms converges to zero asymptotically faster than in optimal symmetric mechanisms
(O( 1
n
) compared to O( logn
n
), for the uniform distribution).
We now demonstrate the properties above with an example for the simplest case: a
2-bidder mechanism where each player has two possible bids (i.e., 1 bit) and the values are
distributed uniformly.
Example 1. Consider two players, Alice and Bob, with values uniformly distributed between
[0, 1]. A 1-bit auction among these players can be described by a 2x2 matrix, where Alice
chooses a row, and Bob chooses a column. Each entry of the matrix specifies the allocation
and payments given a combination of bids. The mechanism is allowed to toss coins to
determine the allocations. Figure 1 describes an example for such a mechanism, and we
denote this mechanism by g1.
A strategy defines how a player determines his bid according to his private value. We
first note that in g1, both players have dominant strategies, i.e., strategies that are optimal
regardless of the actions of the other players. Consider the following threshold strategy:
“ bid 1 if your valuation is greater than 13 , else bid 0”. Clearly, this strategy is dominant
for Alice in g1: when her valuation is smaller than
1
3 she will gain a negative utility if she
bids “1”; When her valuation is greater than 13 , bidding “0” gives her a utility of zero, but
she can get positive utility by bidding “1”. Similarly, a threshold strategy with the threshold
2
3 is dominant for Bob.
The social welfare in a mechanism measures the total happiness of the players from
the outcome, or in our case, the value of the player that receives the item. The expected
welfare in g1, given that the players follow their dominant strategies, is easily calculated to
be 3554 = 0.648: both players will bid “0” with probability
1
3 ·
2
3 , and the expected welfare in
this case equals the expected value of Bob, 12 ·
2
3 . Similar computations show that the expected
welfare is indeed:
1
3
2
3
(
2
3
)
2
+
1
3
(1−
2
3
)
(
1 + 23
)
2
+ (1−
1
3
)
2
3
(
1 + 13
)
2
+ (1−
1
3
)(1 −
2
3
)
(
1 + 23
)
2
=
35
54
We see that despite restricting the communication from an infinite number of bits to
a single bit only, a relatively small welfare loss of 154 was incurred. Of course, a random
allocation that can be implemented without communication at all will result in an expected
welfare of 12 , and this may be regarded as our naive benchmark.
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It turns out that the mechanism described in Figure 1 maximizes the expected welfare:
no other 1-bit mechanism achieves strictly higher expected welfare with any pair of bidders’
strategies (that is, regardless of the concept of equilibrium we use). We note that the optimal
mechanism is asymmetric (a “priority game”) – ties are always broken in favor of Bob, and
that this mechanism is optimal even when randomized decisions are allowed. Note that
the optimal symmetric 1-bit mechanism uses randomization, but only achieves an expected
welfare of 0.625 (the mechanism is illustrated in Appendix A.3 and see also Footnote 20).
Finally, we note that the optimal thresholds of the players are “mutually centered”. That
is, Alice’s value 13 is the average value of Bob when he bids 0 and Bob’s value
2
3 is the average
value of Alice when she bids 1. The intuition is simple: given that Bob bids “0”, his average
value is 12 ·
2
3 =
1
3 . For which values of Alice should an efficient mechanism give her the
item? Clearly when her value is greater than the average value of Bob. Therefore, Alice
should use the threshold 13 .
The most closely related work in the economic literature is by Harstad and Rothkopf
(1994), who considered similar questions in cases of restricting the bid levels in oral auctions
to discrete levels, and by Wilson (1989) and McAfee (2002) who analyzed the inefficiency
caused by discrete priority classes of buyers. In particular, Wilson showed that as the num-
ber k of priority classes grows, the efficiency loss is asymptotically proportional to 1
k2
. While
in the work of Wilson the buyers’ aggregate demand is known while supply is uncertain,
in our model the demand is uncertain. Both Wilson and Harstad and Rothkopf restrict
attention to symmetric mechanisms, while we show that creating endogenous asymmetry
among ex ante identical buyers is beneficial. Another related work is by Bergemann and
Pesendorfer (2001), where the seller can decide on the accuracy by which bidders know their
private values. This problem is different than ours, since the bidders in our model know
their valuations. The work by Parkes (2005) is also related. He compared the efficiency
of simultaneous and sequential auctions under uncertainties on the values of the players.
Recent work also studied similar discrete-bid model in the context of ascending auctions
and auctions that use take-it-or-leave-it offers (Kress & Boutilier, 2004; Sandholm & Gilpin,
2006; David, Rogers, Schiff, Kraus, & Jennings, 2005).
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents our model definition and
introduces our notations and Section 3 presents a characterization of the welfare- and profit-
optimal 2-bidder auctions. Section 4 characterizes optimal mechanisms with an arbitrary
number of bidders, but 2 possible bids for each player. In Section 5 we give an asymptotic
analysis of the minimal welfare and profit losses in the optimal mechanisms. Finally, Section
6 compares simultaneous and sequential mechanisms with bounded communication.
2. The Model
This section presents our formal model and the notations we use.
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B
A
0 1
0 B wins and pays 0 B wins and pays 0
1 A wins and pays 13 B wins and pays
2
3
Figure 1: (g1) A 2-bidder 1-bit game that achieves maximal expected welfare. For example, when
Alice (the rows bidder) bids “1” and Bob bids “0”, Alice wins and pays 13 .
2.1 The Bidders and the Mechanism
We consider single item, sealed bid auctions among n risk-neutral players. Player i has a
private valuation for the object vi ∈ [a, b].
4 The valuations are independently drawn from
cumulative probability functions Fi. In some parts of our analysis
5, we assume the existence
of an always-positive probability density function fi. We will sometime treat the seller as
one of the bidders, numbered 0. The seller has a constant valuation v0 for the item. We
consider a normalized model, i.e., bidders’ valuations for not having the item are a.
The novelty in our model, compared to the standard mechanism-design settings, is that
each bidder i can send a message of ti = lg(ki) bits to the mechanism, i.e., player i can
choose one of possible ki bids (or messages). Denote the possible set of bids for bidder i
as βi = {0, 1, 2, ..., ki − 1}. In each auction, bidder i chooses a bid bi ∈ βi. A mechanism
should determine the allocation and payments given a vector of bids b = (b1, ..., bn):
Definition 1. A mechanism g is composed of a pair of functions (a, p) where:
• a : (β1 × ...× βn)→ [0, 1]
n+1 is the allocation scheme (not necessarily deterministic).
We denote the ith coordinate of a(b) by ai(b), which is bidder i’s probability for winning
the item when the bidders bid b. Clearly, ∀i ∀b ai(b) ≥ 0 and ∀b
∑n
i=0 ai(b) = 1. If
a0(b) > 0, the seller will keep the item with a positive probability.
• p : (β1 × ...× βn)→ ℜ
n is the payment scheme. pi(b) is the payment of the ith bidder
given a vector of bids b.6
Definition 2. In a mechanism with k possible bids, for every bidder i, |βi| = ki = k.
We denote the set of all the mechanisms with k possible bids among n bidders by Gn,k.
We denote the set of all the n-bidder mechanisms in which |βi| = ki for each bidder i, by
Gn,(k1,...,kn).
A strategy si for bidder i in a game g ∈ Gn,(k1,...,kn) describes how a bidder determines
his bid according to his valuation, i.e., it is a function si : [a, b] → {0, 1, ..., ki − 1}. Let
4. For simplicity, we use the range [0, 1] in some parts of the paper. Using the general interval will be
required, though, for the characterization of the optimal mechanisms, mainly due to the reduction we
use for maximizing the revenue that translates the original support to their virtual valuations that are
drawn from another interval.
5. That is, in the characterization of the optimal mechanisms in Sections 3.2 and 4 and when using the
concept of virtual valuation in Sections 3.3 and 5.2
6. Note that we allow non-deterministic allocations, but we ignore non-deterministic payments (since we
are interested in expected values, using lottery for the payments has no effect on our results).
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s−i denote the strategies of the bidders except i, i.e., s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn). We
sometimes use the notation s = (si, s−i).
Definition 3. A real vector (t0, t1, ..., tk) is a vector of threshold values if t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tk.
Definition 4. A strategy si is a threshold strategy based on a vector of threshold values
(t0, t1, ..., tk), if for every bid j ∈ {0, ..., ki−1} and for every valuation vi ∈ [tj , tj+1), bidder
i bids j when his valuation is vi, i.e., si(vi) = j (and for every vi, vi ∈ [t0, tk]). We say
that si is a threshold strategy, if there exists a vector t of threshold values such that si is a
threshold strategy based on t.
2.2 Optimality Criteria
The bidders aim to maximize their (quasi-linear) utilities. The utility of bidder i is a when
he loses (and pay nothing), and vi − pi when he wins and pay pi. Let ui(g, s) denote the
expected utility of bidder i from a game g when the bidders use the vector of strategies s
(implicit here is that this utility depends on the value vi).
Definition 5. A strategy si for bidder i is dominant in a mechanism g ∈ Gn,(k1,...,kn) if
regardless of the other bidders’ strategies s−i, i cannot increase his expected utility by a
deviation to another strategy, i.e.,
∀s˜i ∀s−i ui(g, (si, s−i)) ≥ ui(g, (s˜i, s−i))
Definition 6. A profile of strategies s = (s1, ..., sn) forms a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) in a mechanism g ∈ Gn,(k1,...,kn), if for every bidder i, si is the best response for the
strategies s−i of the other bidders, i.e.,
∀i ∀s˜i ui(g, (si, s−i)) ≥ ui(g, (s˜i, s−i))
We use standard participation constraints definitions: We say that a profile of strategies
s = (s1, ..., sn) is ex-post individually rational in a mechanism g, if every bidder never pays
more than his actual valuation (for any realization of the valuations); we will assume a
strong version of this definition that holds even in randomized mechanisms. We say that a
strategies profile s = (s1, ..., sn) is interim individually rational in a mechanism g if every
bidder i achieves a non-negative expected utility, given any valuation he might have, when
the other bidders play with s−i.
Our goal is to find optimal, communication-bounded mechanisms. As the mechanism
designers, we will try to optimize “social” criteria such as welfare (efficiency) and the seller’s
profit.
The expected welfare from a mechanism g, when bidders use the strategies s, is the
expected social surplus. Because the item is indivisible, the social surplus is actually the
valuation of the bidder who receives the item. If the seller keeps the item, the social welfare
is v0.
Definition 7. Let w(g, s) denote the expected welfare (or expected efficiency) in the n-bidder
game g when the bidders’ strategies are s, i.e., the expected value of the player (possibly the
seller) who receives the item in g. Let wopt
n,(k1,...,kn)
denote the maximal possible expected
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welfare from any n-bidder game where each bidder i has ki possible bids, with any vector of
strategies allowed, i.e.,
wopt
n,(k1,...,kn)
= max
g∈Gn,(k1,...,kn), s
w(g, s)
When all bidders have k possible bids we use the notation woptn,k = w
opt
n,(k,...,k)
Actually, the optimal welfare should have been defined as the maximum expected welfare
that can be obtained in equilibrium. Since we later show that the optimal welfare without
strategic considerations is dominant-strategy implementable, we use the above definition
for simplicity. Note that even in the absence of communication restrictions, optimizing
the welfare objective is obtained by a first-best solution (using the VCG scheme); profit
maximization, on the other hand, is obtained by a second-best solution (incentive constraints
bind in Myerson’s auction, Myerson, 1981).
Definition 8. The seller’s profit is the payment received from the winning bidder, or v0
when the seller keeps the item.7 Let r(g, s) denote the expected profit in the n-bidder game
g where the bidders’ strategies are s. Let roptn,k denote the maximal expected profit from an
n-bidder mechanism with k possible bids and some vector of interim individually-rational
strategies s that forms a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in g:
roptn,k = max
g ∈ Gn,k
s is interim IR and in BNE in g
r(g, s)
Note that we define the optimal welfare as the maximal welfare among all mechanisms
and strategies, not necessarily in equilibria, and we define the optimal profit as the maximal
profit achievable in interim-IR Bayesian-Nash equilibria in any mechanism. Yet, the optimal
mechanisms (for both measures) that we present in this paper implement these optimal
values with dominant strategies and ex-post IR.8
Definition 9. We say that a mechanism g ∈ Gn,k achieves the optimal welfare (resp.
profit), if g has an interim-IR Bayesian-Nash equilibrium s for which the expected welfare
(resp. profit) is w(g, s) = woptn,k (resp. r(g, s) = r
opt
n,k ).
We say that a mechanism g ∈ Gn,k incurs a welfare loss (resp. profit loss) of L, if it
achieves an expected welfare (resp. profit) which is additively smaller than the optimal wel-
fare (resp. profit) with unbounded communication by L (the optimal results with unbounded
communications are the best results achievable with interim-IR Bayesian-Nash equilibria).
3. Optimal Mechanisms for Two Bidders
In this section we present 2-bidder mechanisms with bounded communication that achieve
optimal welfare and profit. In Section 4 we will present the characterization of the welfare-
optimal and profit-optimal n-bidder mechanisms with 2 possible bids for each bidder. The
7. When v0 = 0, the expected profit is equivalent to the seller’s expected revenue.
8. Note that ex-ante IR, i.e., when bidders do not know their type when choosing their strategies, is non-
interesting in this model, since the auctioneer can then simply ask each bidder to pay her expected
valuation.
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characterization of the optimal mechanisms in the most general case (n bidders and k possi-
ble bids) remains an open question. Anyway, our asymptotic analysis of the optimal welfare
loss and the profit loss (in Section 5) holds for the general case, and shows asymptotically
optimal mechanisms.
We first show that the allocation rules in efficient mechanisms have a certain structure
we call priority games. The term priority game means that the allocation rule uses an
asymmetric tie breaking rule: the winning player is the player with the highest priority
among the bidders that bid the highest. One consequence is that the bidder with the lowest
priority will win only when his bid is strictly higher than all other bids. Note that the
term “priority game” refers to the asymmetry in the mechanism’s allocation function, but
additional asymmetry will also appear in the payment scheme. A modified priority game
has a similar allocation, except the item is not allocated when all the bidders bid their
lowest bid.9 We will mostly be interested in such mechanisms when the players have the
same bid space βi.
Definition 10. A game is called a priority game if it allocates the item to the bidder i that
bids the highest bid (i.e., when bi > bj for all j 6= i, the allocation is ai (b) = 1 and aj (b) = 0
for j 6= i), with ties consistently broken according to a pre-defined order on the bidders.
A game is called a modified priority game if it has an allocation as of a priority game,
except when all bidders bid 0, the seller keeps the item.
It turns out to be useful to build the payment scheme of such mechanisms according to
a given profile of threshold strategies:
Definition 11. An n-bidder priority game based on a profile of threshold values’ vectors
−→
t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ ×ni=1ℜ
k+1 (where for every i, ti0 ≤ t
i
1 ≤ ... ≤ t
i
k) is a mechanism
whose allocation is a priority game and its payment scheme is as follows: when bidder j
wins the item for a vector of bids b she pays the smallest valuation she might have and
still win the item, given that she uses the threshold strategy sj based on t
j, i.e, pj(b) =
min{vj |aj (sj(vj), b−j) = 1}. We denote this mechanism as PGk(
−→
t ). A modified priority
game with a similar payment rule is called a modified priority game based on a profile of
threshold-value vectors, and is denoted by MPGk(
−→
t ).
For 2-bidder games, we may use the notations PGk(x, y), MPGk(x, y) (where x, y are
some vectors of threshold values). The mechanisms PGk(x, y) and MPGk(x, y) are pre-
sented in Figure 2. Note PGk(x, y) and MPGk(x, y) differ only when bidder A bids “0”
(i.e., the first line of the game’s matrix).
We now observe that priority games and the modified priority games, with the payments
schemes that were described above, have two desirable properties: they admit a dominant-
strategy equilibrium, and they are ex-post individually rational when the players follow
these dominant strategies.
As for the dominant strategies, a well known result in mechanism design (see Mookherjee
& Reichelstein, 1992 and also Lemma 1 in Segal, 2003) states that for any monotone10
9. Modified priority games can be viewed as priority games that treat the seller as one of the bidders with
the lowest “priority” (then, the seller always bids his second-lowest bid).
10. A mechanism is monotone if the probability that some bidder wins increases as he raises his bid, fixing
the bids of the other bidders. See Definition 12 below for our model.
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allocation rule there is some transfer (i.e., payment) rule that would implement the desired
allocation in dominant strategies. For deterministic auctions, to support this equilibrium,
each winning bidder should pay the smallest valuation for which she still wins (fixing the
behavior of the other bidders). The payments in Definition 11 are defined in this way, and
therefore they support the dominant-strategy implementation. It follows that the threshold
strategies based on the threshold values vector
−→
t are dominant in both PGk(
−→
t ) and
MPGk(
−→
t ). It is clear from the definition of priority games and modified priority games
that, when playing their dominant threshold strategies, winning players will never pay more
than their value, and losing players will pay zero. Ex-post IR follows.
Actually, the observation about the payments that lead to dominant strategies is even
more general. We observe that monotone mechanisms reveal enough information, despite
the communication constraints, to find transfer rules that support the dominant-strategy
implementation. Therefore, when characterizing the optimal mechanisms we can focus on
defining monotone allocation schemes under the communication restrictions, and the trans-
fers that lead to dominant-strategy equilibria can be concluded “for free”. In other words,
we can use the 2-stage approach that is widely used in the mechanism-design literature also
for bounded-communication settings: first solve the optimal allocation rule, and then con-
struct transfers that satisfy the desired incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality
constraints.
Remark 1. This argument holds for more general environments: in environments in which
each player has a one-dimensional private value and a quasi-linear utility, if a non-monetary
allocation rule can be implemented in dominant strategies with some transfers, then any
communication protocol11 realizing this rule also reveals enough information to construct
supporting transfers for the dominant strategies. To see this, recall that in direct-revelation
mechanisms (i.e., with unbounded communication), if the allocation rule proves to be
monotonic, there are transfers that support a dominant-strategy equilibrium. The transfers
will be defined according to some allocation-dependent thresholds, e.g., for a deterministic
allocation rule every bidder should pay the smallest valuation for which she still wins. By
standard revelation-principle arguments, any monotonic allocation rule in bounded com-
munication mechanisms, can be viewed as a monotonic direct-revelation mechanism with
unbounded communication, and therefore such supporting transfers exist. The supporting
transfers are determined by the changes in the allocation rule as the valuation of each bidder
increases, so the transfers change as the allocation rule changes. Thus, with the same com-
munication protocol that is used for determining the allocation, we can reveal the transfers
that support a dominant-strategy implementation.
3.1 The Efficiency of Priority Games
The characterization of the welfare-maximizing mechanism is done in two steps: we first
show that the allocation scheme in 2-bidder priority games is optimal12. Afterwards, we
will characterize the strategies of the players that lead to welfare maximization in priority
11. Here we deal with simultaneous communication, i.e., where all bidders send their messages simultane-
ously. Our observation is not true for sequential mechanisms (see Section 6).
12. We assume, w.l.o.g., throughout this paper that in 2-bidder priority games B ≻ A, i.e., the mechanism
allocates the item to A if she bids higher than B, and otherwise to B.
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0 1 ... k-2 k-1
0 B, y0 B, y0 ... B, y0 B, y0
1 A, x1 B, y1 ... B, y1 B, y1
2 A, x1 A,x2 ... B, y2 B, y2
... ... ... ... ... ...
k-2 A, x1 A,x2 ... B, yk−2 B, yk−2
k-1 A, x1 A,x2 ... A,xk−1 B, yk−1
0 1 ... k-2 k-1
0 φ B, y1 ... B, y1 B, y1
1 A,x1 B, y1 ... B, y1 B, y1
2 A,x1 A, x2 ... B, y2 B, y2
... ... ... ... ... ...
k-2 A,x1 A, x2 ... B, yk−2 B, yk−2
k-1 A,x1 A, x2 ... A, xk−1 B, yk−1
Figure 2: A priority game (left) and a modified priority game (right) both based on the threshold
values’ vectors x, y. In each entry, the left argument denotes the winning bidder, and the
right argument is the price she pays. The mechanisms differ in the allocation for all-zero
bids, and the payments in the first row.
games; this will complete the description of the outcome of the mechanism for every profile
of bidder valuations. These two stages do not take strategic behavior of the bidders into
account. Yet, as observed before, since the allocation scheme is proved to be monotone,
there exists a payment scheme for which these strategies are dominant.
Definition 12. A mechanism g ∈ Gn,k is monotone if for any vector of bids b and for
any bidder i, the probability that bidder i wins the item cannot decrease when only his bid
increases, i.e.,
∀b ∀i ∀b
′
i > bi ai(bi, b−i) ≤ ai(b
′
i, b−i)
In the following theorem we prove that priority games are welfare maximizing. The
proof is composed of four steps: We first show that we can assume that the bidders in the
optimal mechanisms use threshold strategies. Then, we show that the allocation in the op-
timal mechanisms is, w.l.o.g., monotone and deterministic. We then show that the optimal
mechanisms do not “waste” communication, i.e., no two “rows” or two “columns” in the
allocation matrix of the optimal mechanism are identical. Finally, we use these properties,
together with several combinatorial arguments, to derive the optimality of priority games.
Theorem 3.1. (Priority games’ efficiency) For every pair of distribution functions of
the bidders’ valuations, and for every v0, the optimal welfare (i.e., w
opt
2,k ) is achieved in
either a priority game or a modified priority game (with some pair of threshold strategies).
Proof. We first prove the theorem given that the seller has a low reservation value, i.e.,
v0 ≤ a. Recall that at this point we aim to find the welfare-maximizing allocation scheme,
without taking the incentives of the bidders into account. The proof uses the following
three claims. For a later use, Claims 3.2 and 3.3 are proved for n players.
Claim 3.2. (Optimality of threshold strategies) Given any mechanism g ∈ Gn,(k1,...,kn),
there exists a vector of threshold strategies s that achieve the optimal welfare in g among
all possible strategies, i.e., w(g, s) = max
esw(g, s˜).
Proof. (sketch - a formal proof is given in Appendix A.1)
Given a profile of welfare-maximizing strategies in g, we can modify the strategy of each
bidder (w.l.o.g., bidder 1) to be a threshold strategy maintaining at least the same expected
welfare. The idea is that fixing the strategies s−1 of the other bidders, the expected welfare
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achieved when bidder 1 bids some bid b1 is a linear function in bidder i’s value v1. The
maximum of all these linear functions is a piecewise-linear function, and it specifies the
optimal welfare as a function of v1. Bidder 1 can use a threshold strategy according to the
breaking points of this piecewise-linear function that choose the welfare-maximizing linear
function at each segment. Clearly, there are at most k − 1 breaking points.
Claim 3.3. (Optimality of deterministic, monotone mechanisms) For every n and
k1, ..., kn, there exists a mechanism g ∈ Gn,(k1,...,kn) with optimal welfare (i.e., there exists
a profile s of strategies such that w(g, s) = wopt
n,(k1,...,kn)
) which is monotone, deterministic
(i.e., the winner is fixed for each combination of bids) and in which the seller never keeps
the item.
Proof. Consider a mechanism g ∈ Gn,(k1,...,kn) and a profile s of strategies that maximize
the expected welfare, that is, w(g, s) = wopt
n,(k1,...,kn)
. A social planner, aiming to maximize
the welfare, will always allocate the item to the bidder with the highest expected valuation.
That is, for each combination of bids b = (b1, .., bn) we will allocate the item (i.e., ai(b) = 1)
to a bidder i such that i ∈ argmaxj(E(vj |sj(vj) = bj)). The expected welfare clearly did
not decrease. In addition, we always allocate the item (we assume that v0 ≤ a), and the
allocation is deterministic. Finally, we can assume, w.l.o.g., that for each bidder i the bids’
names (i.e., “0”,”1” etc.) are ordered according to the expected value this bidder has.
Then, the mechanism will also be monotone: if a winning bidder i increases his bid, his
expected valuation will also increase, while the expected welfare of all the other bidders will
not change. Thus, bidder i will still have the maximal expected valuation.
Claim 3.4. (Additional bids strictly help) Consider a deterministic, monotone mech-
anism g ∈ G2,k in which the seller never keeps the item. If g achieves the optimal expected
welfare, then in the matrix representation of g no two rows (or columns) have an identical
allocation scheme.
Proof. The idea that an optimal protocol exploits all its communication resources is intu-
itive, although it does not hold in all settings (a trivial example is calculating the parity of
two binary numbers, more involved examples can be found in Kushilevitz & Nisan, 1997).
We do not have a simple proof for this statement in our model, and the proof is based on
Lemma A.1 in the appendix in the following way: Consider such an optimal mechanism
g ∈ G2,k with two identical rows. This mechanism achieves the optimal welfare when the
players use some profile of strategies s. g’s monotonicity implies that the two identical rows
are adjacent. Thus, there is a mechanism with g˜ ∈ G2,(k−1,k) with k − 1 possible bids for
the rows bidder that achieves exactly the same expected welfare as g (when the identical
rows are united to one). This welfare is achieved with the same strategies s of the bidders,
where the rows player bids the united row instead of the two identical rows. The claim will
now follow from Lemma A.1 in the appendix. According to this lemma, the optimal welfare
from a game where both bidders have k possible bids cannot be achieved when one of the
bidders has only k − 1 possible bids (i.e., wopt2,k > w
opt
2,(k−1,k)).
Now, due to Claim 3.3, there is a deterministic, monotone game in which the item
must be sold that achieves wopt2,k . In such games, the allocation scheme in some row i looks
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like [A, ..., A,B...B]. Due to Claim 3.4, in the matrix representation of this optimal game,
there are no two rows with the same allocation scheme. There are k+1 possible monotone
rows for the game matrix (with prefix of 0 to k A’s), but our mechanism has only k rows.
Similarly, we have k different columns (of possible k+1) in the mechanism. Assume that
the row [B,B, ..., B] is in g. Then, the column [A,A, ..., A] is clearly not in g. Therefore,
our game matrix consists of all the columns except [A,A, ..., A], which compose the priority
game where B ≻ A. If the row [B,B, ..., B] is not in g, then g is the priority game where
A ≻ B.
Next, we complete the proof for any seller’s valuation v0. Consider a mechanism h ∈ G2,k
and a pair of threshold strategies based on some threshold-value vectors x˜, y˜ that achieve
the optimal welfare among all mechanisms and strategies (due to Claim 3.2, such strategies
exist). We will modify h, such that the expected welfare (with x˜, y˜) will not decrease. Let
a be the smallest index such that E(vA|x˜a ≤ vA ≤ x˜a+1) ≥ v0. Let b be the smallest index
such that E(vB |y˜b ≤ vB ≤ y˜b+1) ≥ v0. If a = 0 or b = 0, the item is never allocated to the
seller, and the efficient mechanism is as if v0 ≤ a.
When a, b > 0, consider some vector of bids (i, j). When i < a and j < b, the expected
valuations of both A and B are smaller than v0 . Thus, the seller should keep the item for
optimal welfare. When i < a and j ≥ b, the expected welfare of bidder B is above v0, and
A’s expected welfare is below v0, thus we can allocate the item to B and the welfare will not
decrease. Similarly, we should allocate the item to A when i ≥ a and j < b. When i < a,
the allocation is done regardless to i, thus we can assume that xa is the first threshold (i.e.,
a = 1), and similarly b = 1.
Now, we show the optimal allocation for combinations of bids (i, j) such that i ≥ a and
j ≥ b. Here, the item will not be allocated to the seller, so we actually perform an auction
with k−1 possible bids for each bidder, when the bidders’ valuation are in the range [x˜1, 1],
[y˜1, 1]. Note that the proof (above) for the case of v0 ≤ a holds for such ranges, so the
optimal welfare is achieved in a priority game. Altogether, the optimal mechanism turns
out to be a modified priority game.
3.2 Efficient 2-bidder Mechanisms with k Possible Bids
Now, we can finally characterize the efficient mechanisms in our model. It turns out that
the optimal threshold values for priority games are mutually centered, i.e., each threshold
is the expected valuation of the other bidder, given that the valuation of the other bidder
lies between his two adjacent thresholds.
Definition 13. The threshold values x = (x0, x1, ..., xk−1, xk), y = (y0, y1, ..., yk−1, yk) for
bidders A,B respectively are mutually centered, if the following constraints hold:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 xi = E(vB |yi−1 ≤ vB ≤ yi ) =
∫ yi
yi−1
fB(vB) · vBdvB
FB(yi)− FB(yi−1)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 yi = E(vA |xi ≤ vA ≤ xi+1 ) =
∫ xi+1
xi
fA(vA) · vAdvA
FA(xi+1)− FA(xi)
It is easy to see that given any pair of distribution functions, a pair −→x ,−→y of mutually-
centered vectors is uniquely defined (when xk = yk and, w.l.o.g., y1 ≥ x1). The basic
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idea is that if x1 is known, we can clearly calculate y1 (the smallest value that solves
x1 = EvB (vB |y0 ≤ vB ≤ y1 )). Similarly, it is easy to see that all the variables xi and yi can
be considered as continuous, monotone functions of x1. Now, let z be the solution for the
equation yk−1 = E(vA|xk−1 ≤ vA ≤ z). For satisfying all the 2(k − 1) equations, z must
equal xk. Since z is also a continuous monotone function of x1, there is only a single value
of x1 for which all the equations hold.
The following intuition shows why the optimal thresholds in priority games must be
mutually centered: Assume that Alice bids i, that is, her value is in the range [xi, xi+1]. In
a monotone mechanism, the mechanism designer has to decide what is the minimal value for
which Bob wins when Alice bids i. If the value of Bob is at least the average value of Alice,
given that she bids i, then Bob should clearly receive the item. Therefore, Bob’s threshold
will be exactly this expected value of Alice. The proof has to handle few subtleties for
which the intuition above does not suffice (like the characterization of the first thresholds in
the optimal modified priority games, see below), thus we will derive the mutually-centered
condition from the solution of the optimization problem.
Let xw = (a = xw0 , x
w
1 , ..., x
w
k−1, x
w
k = b) and y
w = (a = yw0 , y
w
1 , ..., y
w
k−1, y
w
k = b) be
mutually-centered threshold values (w.l.o.g., yw1 ≥ x
w
1 ).
Let x = (a = x0, x1, ..., xk−1, xk = b) and y = (a = y0, y1, ..., yk−1, yk = b) be two threshold-
value vectors for which the following constraints hold:
• (x1, ..., xk−1, b) and (y1, ..., yk−1, b) are mutually-centered vectors13.
• x1 = v0 and y1 =
1
FA(x2)
·
(
v0FA(v0) +
∫ x2
x1
vAfA(vA)dvA
)
The following theorem says that if the valuation of the seller for the item (v0) is small
enough (e.g., a), the efficient mechanism is a priority game based on xw and yw (which are
mutually centered). Otherwise, the optimal welfare can be achieved in a modified priority
game based on x and y.
Theorem 3.5. For any pair of distribution functions of the bidders’ valuations, and for
any seller’s valuation v0 for the item, the mechanism PGk(x
w, yw) or the mechanism
MPGk(x, y) achieves the optimal welfare (i.e., w
opt
2,k). In particular, PGk(x
w, yw) achieves
the optimal welfare when v0 = a.
Proof. First, we prove that PGk(x
w, yw) is optimal when v0 = a. According to Theorem
3.1 there is a pair of threshold values’ vectors x = (x0, x1, ..., xk),y = (y0, y1, ..., yk) such
that PGk(x, y) achieves the optimal welfare. Note that x0 = y0 = a and xk = yk = b, so we
have 2(k − 1) variables to optimize.
We will calculate the total expected welfare by summing first the expected welfare in
the entries of the game matrix where B wins the item, then summing the entries where A
is the winner.
w(g, s) =
k∑
i=1
(FB(yi)− FB(yi−1)) · (FA(xi)− FA(x0)) ·
∫ yi
yi−1
fB(vB)vBdvB
FB(yi)− FB(yi−1)
13. Again, a unique solution exists when, w.l.o.g., y2 ≥ x2
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+
k∑
i=2
(FA(xi)− FA(xi−1)) · (FB(yi−1)− FB(y0)) ·
∫ xi
xi−1
fA(vA)vAdvA
FA(xi)− FA(xi−1)
=
k∑
i=1
FA(xi) ·
∫ yi
yi−1
fB(vB)vBdvB +
k∑
i=2
FB(yi−1) ·
∫ xi
xi−1
fA(vA)vAdvA
We assume here that a probability density function exists for each bidder. Thus, we can
express the partial derivatives with respect to all variables:
(w(g, s))
′
xi
=
(∫ yi
yi−1
fB(vB)vBdvB
)
· fA(xi)+ fA(xi) · xi ·FB(yi−1)− fA(xi) ·xi ·FB(yi) = 0
(w(g, s))
′
yi
=
(∫ xi+1
xi
fA(vA)vAdvA
)
· fB(yi)+ fB(yi) · yi ·FA(xi)− fB(yi) · yi ·FA(xi+1) = 0
Rearranging the terms derives that yi = EvA(vA |xi ≤ vA ≤ xi+1 ) and that
xi = EvB (vB |yi−1 ≤ vB ≤ yi ) and therefore, x, y should be mutually centered for optimal
efficiency.
Now, we no longer assume v0 = a: According to Theorem 3.1, if the optimal welfare is
not achieved in the priority game above, it will be achieved in a modified priority game.
For some threshold values’ vectors x, y, the expected welfare in MPGk(x, y) is given by the
formula:
FA(x1) · FB(y1) · v0 + FA(x1)
∫ b
y1
vBfB(vB)dvB + FB(y1)
∫ b
x1
vAfA(vA)dvA
+
k∑
i=2
(FA(xi)− FA(x1))
∫ yi
yi−1
vBfB(vB)dvB
+
k∑
i=3
(FB(yi−1)− FB(y1))
∫ xi
xi−1
vAfA(vA)dvA
First-order condition similarly derive the constraints on x1 and y1 given in the above defin-
ition of x, y, and that (x1, ..., xk−1, xk) and (y1, ..., yk−1, yk) should be mutually-centered14.
We demonstrate the characterization given above by showing an explicit solution for the
case of uniformly-distributed valuations in [0, 1].
Corollary 3.6. When the bidders’ valuations are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and v0 = 0,
the mechanism PGk(x, y) achieves the optimal welfare where
x = (0,
1
2k − 1
,
3
2k − 1
, ...,
2k − 3
2k − 1
, 1) , y = (0,
2
2k − 1
,
4
2k − 1
, ...,
2k − 2
2k − 1
, 1)
14. The results are not surprising, since except for the case when one of the bidders bids 0, we have a priority
game’s allocation for which the optimal threshold values must be mutually centered (due to the first
part of the proof).
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Proof. According to Theorem 3.5 optimal welfare is achieved with PGk(x, y), when x, y are
mutually centered. With uniform distributions, this derives the following constraints, for
which the given vectors x, y are the unique solution: ∀1≤i≤k−1 xi =
yi−1+yi
2 yi =
xi+xi+1
2
To see how the above constraints are implied, note that the conditional expectation of the
second player’s value, given that his value is uniformly distributed between yi−1 and yi, is
exactly yi−1+yi2 .
For example, when k = 2 we have the constraints x1 =
0+y1
2 and y1 =
x1+1
2 , implying
that x1 = 1/3 and y1 = 2/3 as in the optimal 1-bit mechanism from Example 1. The
optimal mutually-centered thresholds for k = 4 are, for instance, x = (0, 17 ,
3
7 ,
5
7 , 1) and
y = (0, 27 ,
4
7 ,
6
7 , 1).
3.3 Profit-Optimal 2-bidder Mechanisms with k Possible Bids
Now, we present profit-maximizing 2-bidder mechanisms. Most results in the literature on
profit-maximizing auctions assume that the distribution functions of the bidders’ valuations
are regular (as defined below). When the valuations of all bidders are distributed with the
same regular distribution function, it is well known that Vickrey’s 2nd-price auction, with
an appropriately chosen reservation price, is profit-optimal (Vickrey, 1961; Myerson, 1981;
Riley & Samuelson, 1981) with unbounded communication.
Definition 14. (Myerson, 1981) Let f be a probability density function, and let F be its
cumulative function. We say that f is regular, if the function
v˜(v) = v −
1− F (v)
f(v)
is monotone, strictly increasing function of v. We call the function v˜(·) the virtual valuation
of the bidder.
For example, when the bidders valuations are distributed uniformly on [0, 1], a bidder
with a valuation v has a virtual valuation of v˜(v) = 2v − 1.
Definition 15. The virtual surplus in a game is the virtual valuation of the bidder (includ-
ing the seller15) who receives the item.
A key observation in the work of Myerson (1981), which we also use, is that in a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, the expected profit equals the expected virtual surplus (in in-
terim individually-rational equilibria where losing bidders are not getting any surplus). We
use this property to reduce the profit-optimization problem to a welfare-optimization prob-
lem, for which we have already given a full solution. Myerson’s observation was originally
proved for direct-revelation mechanisms. We observe here that Myerson’s observation also
holds for auctions with bounded communication. That is, given a k-bid mechanism, the
expected profit in every Bayesian-Nash equilibrium equals the expected virtual surplus.
Proposition 3.7. Let g ∈ Gn,k be a mechanism with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s =
(s1, ..., sn) and interim individual rationality. Then, the expected revenue achieved by s in
g is equal to the expected virtual surplus of s in g.
15. The seller’s virtual valuation is defined to be his “original” valuation (v0).
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Proof. Consider the following direct-revelation mechanism gd: each player i bids her true
valuation vi. The mechanism calculates si(vi) for every i, and determines the allocation
and payments according to g. An easy observation is that gd is incentive compatible (i.e.,
truthful bidding is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the players) and interim individually
rational. According to Myerson observation for direct revelation mechanisms, the expected
revenue in gd is equal to the expected virtual surplus. However, for every combination
of bids, both mechanism output identical allocations and payments. Thus, the expected
revenue and the expected virtual surplus are equal in both mechanisms.
According to Theorem 3.5, the optimal welfare is achieved in either a priority game
or a modified priority game. In a model where bidders consider their virtual valuations as
their valuations, letMPG(x˜, y˜) or PG(x, y) be the mechanisms which are the candidates to
achieve the optimal welfare (see Theorem 3.5 for a full characterization). Now, consider the
same mechanisms, except each payment c˜ in them is replaced by the respective “true” valua-
tion c = v˜−1(c˜) (i.e., c˜ = v˜(c) ). Denote these mechanisms by PGk(xR, yR), MPGk(xr, yr).
These mechanisms achieve the optimal profit in our (original) model. Note that the dis-
tribution functions must be regular (but not necessarily identical) for this reduction to
work.
Theorem 3.8. When both bidders’ valuations are distributed with regular distribution func-
tions, the mechanism MPGk(x
r, yr) or the mechanism PGk(x
R, yR) (see definitions above)
achieve the optimal expected profit among all profits achievable in an interim-IR Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of a mechanism in G2,k (i.e., r
opt
2,k).
Proof. Consider the threshold-value vectors (x˜, y˜) and (x, y) defined above. The mechanism
MPG(x˜, y˜) is efficient in the model where the bidders consider their virtual valuations as
their valuation (the same proof holds if PG(x, y) is the efficient mechanism). The density
function f is regular, and therefore the virtual valuation v˜(·) is strictly increasing. Thus,
MPGk(x
r, yr) (when the bidders use their original valuations) will have exactly the same
allocation for every combination of bids as MPGk(x˜, y˜) (when the bidders consider their
virtual valuations as their valuations). We conclude thatMPGk(x
r, yr) achieves the optimal
expected virtual surplus and thus also the optimal profit.
As in the case of welfare optimization, we give an explicit solution for the case of
uniform distribution functions. This is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.8. Note that the
optimal profit is achieved in a modified priority game. This holds since for the uniform
distribution the bidders’ expected virtual valuation is negative when they bid “0”, so an
efficient mechanism will not sell the item when all bidders bid “0”.
Corollary 3.9. When the bidders’ valuations are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and v0 = 0,
the modified priority game MPGk(x, y) achieves the optimal expected profit among all the
profits achievable in interim-IR Bayesian-Nash equilibria of mechanisms in G2,k, where
x = (0,
1
2
, θ +
1 · (1− θ)
2k − 3
, ..., θ +
(2k − 5) · (1− θ)
2k − 3
, 1)
y = (0, θ, θ +
2 · (1− θ)
2k − 3
, ..., θ +
(2k − 4) · (1− θ)
2k − 3
, 1)
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and θ = −2α+
√
1+3α
2(1−α) for α =
1
(2k−3)2 (θ =
5
8 when k=2).
4. Optimal Mechanisms for n Bidders with Two Possible Bids
In this section we consider games among n bidders where each bidder has 2 possible bids
(i.e., they can send only 1 bit to the mechanism). We give the characterization of the optimal
mechanisms for general distribution functions. The characterization of the optimal n-bidder
mechanism with k possible bids seems to be harder, and it remains an open question. The
difficulty stems from the fact that the monotonicity of the allocation rule does not dictate
the exact allocation rule in the general case. Rather, there are many possible allocation
schemes that we cannot rule out before we know the strategies of the bidders.16 Therefore,
it seems that one should solve the involved combinatorial problem of finding the optimal
allocation rule together with finding the optimal payments. Priority games with 2 possible
bids per player can be interpreted as a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers; the player with
the highest priority in this interpretation is the first player to be offered, if he accepts the
offer (i.e., bids “1”) he will receive it. See the work by Sandholm and Gilpin (2006) for the
analysis of such take-it-or-leave-it mechanisms. Moreover, 1-bit priority games are actually
a solution to a full-information version of the secretary problem (e.g., Gilbert & Mosteller,
1966; Ajtai, Megiddo, & Waarts, 2001). A decision maker meets the players (or potential
secretaries to be hired), one after another, and should search for the player with the highest
value. The decision maker knows the underlying probability distributions. The decision,
however, should be made ”online” – a player that does not receive the item upon arrival
will never receive the item.
4.1 The Characterization of the Optimal Mechanisms
We first observe that priority games also maximize the welfare in n-bidder games with 2 pos-
sible bids. This is easier to see than in the k-possible-bids case. By Claim 3.2 in Theorem 3.1,
the bidders will use threshold strategies. An efficient mechanism will allocate the item, for
each combination of bids
−→
b , to the bidder with the highest expected welfare when he bids bi.
Given that the distributions are i.i.d, if xi ≥ xj then E
(
vi
∣∣vi ∈ [xi, b]) ≥ E (vj ∣∣vj ∈ [xj , b])
and E (vi |vi ∈ [a, xi] ) ≥ E (vj |vj ∈ [a, xj ] ). Therefore, ties will be broken according to the
order of the thresholds. If the seller’s reservation price v0 is high enough, the efficient
mechanism will be a modified priority game.17
We now show the characterization of the optimal thresholds for the priority games. We
show that the optimal mechanisms use fully discriminatory payments: the bidder with the
highest priority in the priority game pays the highest payment when she wins, and so forth.
The optimal modified priority game is given by a simple recursive formula. When the seller
allocates the item for when all bids are zero, the constraints become cyclic.
16. Consider, for example, a 3-bidder 3-bid priority game, where the item is allocated to the player with
the second-highest priority when all the players bid their highest bid. This mechanism is also monotone
with no identical actions for the players.
17. To see this, we must note that in an efficient mechanism the seller will never keep the item when one of
the bidder bids 1 (then, a threshold higher than v0 for this bidder will gain a higher welfare).
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Let −→x = (x1, ..., xn) and
−→y = (y1, ..., yn) be the profiles of threshold values for the n
bidders such that the following constraints hold:
x1 = E (v |a ≤ v ≤ xn ) (1)
∀1≤m≤n−2 xm+1 = (1− F (xm)) · E
(
v
∣∣v ∈ [xm, b])+ F (xm) · xm (2)
xn =
∑n−1
i=1 (
∏n−1
j=i+1 F (xj)) (1− F (xi))E
(
v
∣∣v ∈ [xi, b])
1−
∏n−1
i=1 F (xi)
(3)
y1 = v0 (4)
∀1≤m≤n−2 ym+1 = (1− F (ym)) ·E
(
v
∣∣v ∈ [ym, b])+ F (ym) · ym (5)
We will now prove that either the mechanism PG2(
−→x ) or the mechanismMPG2(
−→y ) achieve
the optimal welfare. As the thresholds description shows, the thresholds for the modified
priority game (i.e., when the seller keeps the item when all bids are zero) are defined by
a simple, easy-to-compute recursive formula. The optimality of these thresholds can be
shown by the following intuitive argument: Consider a new bidder i that joins a set of i− 1
bidders. An efficient auction will allocate the item to bidder i if and only if his value is
greater than the optimal welfare achievable from the first i − 1 bidders. Therefore, the
threshold for each bidder will equal the optimal welfare gained from the preceding bidders;
and indeed, with probability of 1 − F (yi−1), bidder i’s valuation will be greater than the
expected welfare attained from the other bidders (yi−1) and his average contribution will
be E
(
v
∣∣v ∈ [ym, b])); with probability of F (yi−1) he will not contribute to the optimal
welfare which remains yi−1. This intuition shows why the profit-maximizing thresholds
above (Equations 4,5) are independent of the number of players, what enables an “online”
implementation of the profit-maximizing auctions.
Theorem 4.1. When the bidders’ valuations are distributed with the same distribution func-
tion, the mechanism PG2(
−→x ) or the mechanism MPG2(
−→y ) achieves the optimal expected
welfare. In particular, when v0 = a, PG2(
−→x ) is the efficient mechanism.
Proof. We already observed that there exists a priority game that achieves the optimal
welfare with threshold strategies. Consider a priority game among n bidders, indexed
by their priorities (i.e., 1 ≺ 2... ≺ n ). Every bidder wins the item if he bids 1 and
all the bidders with higher priorities bid 0. Thus, the probability that bidder i wins is(∏n
j=i+1 F (xj)
)
· (1− F (xi)). When all bidders bid 0, either bidder n wins or the seller
keeps the item for herself. The expected welfare from this game, where the bidders use
threshold strategies x1, ..., xn is:
w(g, s) =
n∑
i=1
 n∏
j=i+1
F (xj)
 (1− F (xi)) ∫ bxi f(vi)vidvi
(1− F (xi))
+
(
n∏
i=1
F (xi)
)
E0
Where E0 = E(vn|vn ∈ [a, xn]) in the priority game and Eo = v0 in a modified priority
game (the second term relates to the case when all the bidders bid 0). For maximum, the
partial derivatives with respect to x1, ..., xn should equal zero, resulting a characterization
of the optimal solution.
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For bidders 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 we get that xm equals (both in the priority game and in the
modified priority game):
m−1∑
i=1
 m−1∏
j=i+1
F (xj)
 (1− F (xi))E (vi ∣∣vi ∈ [xi, b])+
 m−1∏
i=1,i6=m
F (xi)
E (vn |vn ∈ [a, xn] )
The recursive formula is reached by calculating xm+1 − xm, from which Equations 2 and
5 follow. For bidder n in the priority game the first order conditions yield the constraint
in Equation 3. When m = 1, we have x1 = E (vn |a ≤ vn ≤ xn ) (in the priority game) and
x1 = v0 (in the modified priority game).
As in Section 3, we characterize the profit optimal mechanism by a reduction to the
welfare optimizing problem. Again, the reduction can be performed only for regular distri-
butions. Consider the model where bidders take their virtual valuations as their valuations.
Let PG2(u˜) or MPG2(z˜) be the mechanisms that achieve the optimal welfare in this model
(see Theorem 4.1 above). Let PG2(u) and MPG2(z) be similar mechanisms respectively,
except each payment c˜ is replaced with its respective “original” valuation c = v˜−1(c˜).
Theorem 4.2. When the bidders’ valuations are distributed with the same regular distri-
bution function, the mechanism PG2(u) or the mechanism MPG2(z) achieves the optimal
expected profit among all the profits achievable with a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and in-
terim IR.
Proof. This is a corollary of Theorem 4.1. The reduction is done as in Theorem 3.8, and it
is possible due to the regularity of the distribution function.
Again, the optimal thresholds for the modified priority game can be given by a simple
recursive formula with an intuitive meaning. The recursion is identical to the welfare op-
timizing formula (Equation 2), and the only difference is in the value of the first threshold
that should hold y1 = v˜
−1(v0). The intuition is that given that the best revenue achievable
from the first i − 1 bidders is yi−1, with probability F (yi−1) a new player i will not be
able to pay a higher price (due to the individual-rationality restriction) and therefore the
optimal revenue remains yi−1. When his value is greater than yi−1, he cannot be charged
more than his average value (E(v|yi−1 ≤ v ≤ b)).
Now, we give explicit solutions for the uniform distribution on the support [0, 1]. The
following recursive constraints characterize the efficient and profit-optimal mechanisms –
these are the constraints given in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 for uniform distributions.
Let (x1, ..., xn) ∈ [0, 1]
n be threshold values for which the following constraints hold:
x1 =
xn
2
(6)
∀m ∈ {1, ..., n − 2} xm+1 =
1
2
+
x2m
2
(7)
xn =
∑n−1
i=1
(∏n−1
j=i+1 xj
) (
1− x2i
)
2
(
1−
∏n−1
i=1 xi
) (8)
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Let y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ [0, 1]
n be threshold values where y1 =
1
2 and:
∀m ∈ {1, ..., n − 2} ym+1 =
1
2
+
y2m
2
Corollary 4.3. Consider the threshold values −→x = (x1, ..., xn) and
−→y = (y1, ..., yn) defined
above. When the bidders’ valuations are distributed uniformly in [0, 1] and v0 = 0, PG2(
−→x )
achieves the optimal welfare and MPG2(
−→y ) achieves optimal profit.
For example, when n = 5 we have y = (0.5, 0.625, 0.695, 0.741, 0.775). The above
description is simpler than any closed-form formulae we could find.
5. Asymptotic Analysis of the Welfare and Profit Losses
In this section, we measure the performance of the optimal mechanisms presented in earlier
sections. Although we did not present a characterization of the optimal mechanisms in the
general model of k possible bids and n bidders, we present here mechanisms for this general
case that are asymptotically optimal. For simplicity, we assume that the valuations’ range
is [0, 1] (all the results apply for a general range [a, b] which only changes the constants in
our analysis).
We analyze the welfare loss (Subsection 5.1), the profit loss (Subsection 5.2), and finally,
in Subsection 5.3 we measure the profit loss and the welfare loss in 1-bit mechanism with
n bidders. All the result are asymptotic with respect to the amount of the communication,
except in Section 5.3 where it is with respect to the number of bidders.
5.1 Asymptotic Bounds on the Welfare Loss
The next theorem shows that no matter how the bidders’ valuations are distributed, we can
always construct mechanisms such that the welfare loss they incur diminishes quadratically
in k. This is true for any number of bidders we fix (when k > 2n). In particular, the efficient
mechanism presented in Theorem 3.5 incurs a welfare loss of O( 1
k2
). The intuition behind
the proof: given the distribution functions of the bidders, we construct a certain threshold
strategy, which will be dominant for all bidders. When using this strategy, each bidder will
bid any bid i with probability smaller than 1
k
. This way, the probability that a welfare loss
may occur is O( 1
k
) (for two players, for instance, a welfare loss will be possible only on the
diagonal of the game’s matrix). The average welfare loss will also be O( 1
k
), resulting in a
total expected loss of O( 1
k2
).
Theorem 5.1. For any (fixed) number of bidders n, and for any set of distribution functions
of the bidders’ valuations, there exist a set of mechanisms gk ∈ Gn,k (k = 2n+1, 2n+2, ...),
that incur an expected welfare loss of O( 1
k2
)). These results are implemented in dominant
strategies with ex-post individual rationality.
The requirement that k > 2n (here and in Proposition 5.3 below) is due to the construc-
tion of the symmetric mechanism in the following proof. These results hold even without
this requirement, as shown by an asymmetric construction for a more general setting in the
work of Blumrosen and Feldman (2006).
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Proof. The proof’s idea: we construct a priority game in which all bidders have the same
dominant threshold strategy, such that the probability for a bidder to bid each bid is smaller
than n
k
. This is done by dividing the density functions of all the bidders to k
n
intervals with
equal mass, then combining these thresholds to a vector of k threshold values. Because the
bidders use the same threshold strategy, a welfare loss is possible only when more than one
bidder bids the highest bid. This observation leads to the upper bound.
Let α1, ..., αn be integers such that
∑n
i=1 αi = k − 2, and for every i, αi ≥
⌊
k
n
⌋
− 1
(clearly such numbers exist). For every bidder i, let Y i = (yi1, ..., y
i
αi
) be a set of threshold
values that divide her distribution function fi to αi+1 segments with the same mass (when
yi0 = 0, y
i
αi+1
= 1), i.e., for every bid j, Fi(yj+1)− Fi(yj) =
1
αi+1
.
Let X = {
⋃n
i=1 Y
i}
⋃
{v0}, |X| = k− 1, be the union of all the threshold values (we add
arbitrary threshold values if the size of X is smaller than k− 1). Let x = (0, x1, ..., xk−1, 1)
be a threshold-value vector created by ordering the threshold values in X from smallest to
largest. Now, consider the n-bidder mechanismMPGk(t˜) where t˜ = (x, .., x). The threshold
strategy based on x is dominant for all the bidders, with ex-post IR. By the construction
of the sets Y 1, ..., Y n, every bidder will bid any particular bid w.p. ≤ 2n
k
.18
Next, we will bound the welfare loss. We divide the possible cases according to the
number of bidders who bid the highest bid. Since all the bidders use the same threshold
strategy, if only one bidder bids the highest bid, no welfare loss is incurred (he will definitely
have the highest valuation). If more than 1 bidder bid the highest bid i, the expected welfare
loss will not exceed xi+1 − xi. For a set of bidders T ⊆ N , denote the probability that all
the bidders in T bid i by Pr(T = i), and the probability that all the bidders not in T have
bids smaller than i by Pr(N \T < i). Thus, the expected welfare loss is smaller than (when
2n < k):
n∑
j=2
∑
T⊆N, |T |=j
k∑
i=1
Pr(T = i)Pr(N \ T < i) (xi+1 − xi)
≤
n∑
j=2
∑
T⊆N, |T |=j
k∑
i=1
Pr(T = i) (xi+1 − xi)
≤
n∑
j=2
(nj)∑
1
k∑
i=1
(
2n
k
)j
(xi+1 − xi) =
n∑
j=2
(
n
j
)(
2n
k
)j
< 2n · 4n2 ·
1
k2
When the valuations of all the bidders are smaller than v0, there is no welfare loss (it is
easy to see that we can assume, w.l.o.g., that x1 = v0). Note that despite the coefficient of
1
k2
is exponential in n, we consider it as a constant because n is fixed. For Example, when
n = 2 a similar proof shows a welfare loss smaller than 8
k2
(when k > 3).
Asymptotic quadratic bounds were also given by Wilson (1989), which studied similar
settings regarding the effect of discrete priority classes of customers. In the work of Wilson
the uncertainty was about the supply, while in this paper the demand is uncertain as well.
Both results are illustrations for the idea that the deadweight loss is second order in the
18. For every bidder i, and every bid j, Fi(xj+1)− Fi(xj) ≤
1
⌊ k
n
⌋
≤
2n
k
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price distortion. (The price distortion in our model is the maximum difference between the
prices that different bidders are facing for the item given the others’ bids, and it can be
bounded above by 1
k
.) Indeed, a small price distortion ensures both that the probability of
an inefficient allocation is small and that the inefficiency is small when it does occur.
Theorem 5.1 is related to proposition 4 in the paper by Nisan and Segal (2006). Nisan
and Segal showed that discretizing an exactly efficient continuous protocol communicating
d real numbers yields a “truly polynomial” approximation scheme that is proportional to
d (i.e., for any ǫ > 0 we can realize an approximation factor of 1 − ǫ using a number of
bits which is polynomial in log(ǫ−1) ). Here, we discretize a continuous efficient auction
(e.g., first-price auction), where d is the number of bidders. Discretization then achieves an
approximation error that is exponential in the (minus) number of bits sent per bidder, i.e.,
asymptotically proportional to 1
k
. However, here we care about average-case approximation
which is even closer, because worst-case approximation within an error of ǫ ensures an
average case approximation within ǫ2 (the probability that an error is made is itself in the
order of ǫ).
We now show that the asymptotic upper bound above is tight, i.e., for some distribution
functions (and in particular, for the uniform distribution) the minimal welfare loss is exactly
proportional to 1
k2
. We show this for any constant number of bidders.
Theorem 5.2. Assume that the bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed and that v0 =
0. Then, the efficient 2-bidder mechanism PGk(x, y) described in Corollary 3.6 incurs a
welfare loss of exactly 1
6·(2k−1)2 . Moreover, for any (fixed) number of bidders n and for any
v0, there exists a positive constant c such that any mechanism g ∈ Gn,k incurs a welfare
loss ≥ c · 1
k2
.
Proof. We first prove the first part of the theorem, regarding 2-bidder mechanisms. Note
that the given mechanism can make non-optimal allocation only for combinations of bids
that are on the diagonal or on the lower secondary diagonal in the matrix representation
of the 2-bidder game (i.e., when bA = bB or when bA = bB + 1). For such bids (i, j), the
overlapping segment of [xi, xi+1] and [yj, yj+1] is of size
1
2k−1 . Given such vector of bids
(i, j), if one of the valuations is not in this overlapping segment, the allocation is optimal
(note that we allocate the item to B on the main diagonal, and to A on the secondary
diagonal). The probability that both valuation are in this overlapping range is 1
(2k−1)2 .
The expected valuation in our priority game (when both valuation are in this overlapping
segment) is exactly in the middle of this segment. The expected valuation in the optimal
auction (with unbounded communications), restricted to this overlapping interval, will be
in the 23 point of this range. Thus, the welfare loss is
1
6 of the segment, i.e.,
1
6 ·
1
2k−1 . Thus,
for every vector of bids on the main diagonal or on the secondary-diagonal the expected
welfare loss is 16
1
(2k−1)3 . There are (2k − 1) such vector of bids, thus the total welfare loss
is exactly 1
6(2k−1)2 .
A similar argument shows that even when the seller’s valuation v0 is non zero, the welfare
loss is asymptotically greater than 1
(2k−1)2 : let z1, ..., zm be the sizes of the overlapping
segments (only when the valuations of both bidders are greater than v0). Clearly, m ≤ 2k−1
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and
∑m
i=1 zi ≤ 1. Then, the welfare loss from the game is at least
19:
(1− v0)
2 ·
m∑
i=1
z2i ·
zi
6
=
(1− v0)
2
6
·
m∑
i=1
z3i ≥
(1− v0)
2
6
2k − 1
(2k − 1)3
≥
(1− v0)
2
6
1
(2k − 1)2
The proof of the second statement is easily derived: Consider only the case where bidders
1 and 2 have valuations above 12 , and the rest of the bidders have valuations below
1
2 . This
occurs with the constant probability of 12n . The best a mechanism can do is to always
allocate the item to one of 1 or 2. But due to the first part of the theorem, in any 2-bidder
mechanism a welfare loss of proportional to 1
k2
will be incurred (the fact that the valuation
range is [12 , 1] and not [0, 1] only changes the constant c). This will hold for any opportunity
cost v0 of the seller. Thus, any mechanism will incur a welfare loss of Ω(
1
k2
).
Note that the same asymptotic results hold even if we restrict attention to symmetric
mechanisms. Actually, we prove the upper bound in Theorem 5.1 by constructing a sym-
metric mechanism (we can allocate the item to all the bidders who bid the highest bid with
equal probabilities). However, asymmetric mechanisms do incur a strictly smaller welfare
loss than symmetric mechanisms. For example, when the valuations are distributed uni-
formly, the optimal welfare loss is 16(2k−1)2 (by Theorem 5.2) compared with an optimal
welfare loss of 1
6k2
attained by symmetric mechanisms20 (i.e., the welfare loss in asymmetric
mechanisms is about 4 times better). This observation is interesting in light of the results of
Harstad and Rothkopf (1994) and Wilson (1989). Harstad and Rothkopf studied symmetric
English auctions, and analyzed the optimal price-jumps in such auctions. Our results show
that non-anonymous prices (i.e., different jumps for each bidder) can achieve better results
than symmetric (or anonymous) jumps. We also characterize the optimal price-jumps for
such auctions (mutually centered threshold values). Wilson also studied only symmetric
priority classes in his model, and also gives a convergence rate of 1
n2
for the efficiency loss
(where n is the number of priority classes). We show that asymmetric mechanisms can
incur smaller efficiency loss, although the asymptotic convergence rate is the same.
One obvious drawback of our characterization of the optimal mechanisms is that the
design is not “detail-free” (as in Wilson’s doctrine) – we must know the priors of the
bidders for designing the mechanisms. But can we design a mechanism that regardless of
the distribution functions, will always incur a low welfare loss? The answer is that we
can, but they will not be as efficient as in the commonly-known priors case. We observe
that a simple, symmetric mechanism that use equally spaced thresholds (i.e., PGk(x, ..., x),
x = (0, 1
k
, 2
k
, ..., k−1
k
, 1) ), incurs a welfare loss not greater than 1
k
for all possible distribution
functions. It is not hard to verify that this is actually the best that can be done by
“detail-free” mechanism: for any mechanism there exist distribution functions for which
the expected welfare loss is at least in order of 1
k
. For severely low communication, the
difference between the “detail-free” mechanisms and prior-aware mechanisms (with loss of
19. In the left inequality we use the fact that when z = (z1, ..., zm) is in the m’th dimensional simplex,
Pm
i=1 z
3
i ≥
1
m2
.
20. It is easy to show that efficient symmetric mechanisms are similar to priority games, except the item
is allocated with equal probabilities in cases of ties. The thresholds of the bidders simply divide the
valuations’ range to identical segments. Then, it is straightforward to show that the welfare loss is
exactly 1
6k2
.
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O( 1
k2
) ) may be substantial. Note that without communication constraints, socially-efficient
results can be achieved by “detail-free” mechanisms – second-price (Vickrey) auctions.
5.2 Asymptotic Bounds on the Profit Loss
As done in Theorem 3.8, the profit optimization problem can be reduced to a welfare-
optimization problem by maximizing the expected virtual surplus.
Proposition 5.3. Assume that the bidders’ valuations are distributed with regular distribu-
tion functions. Then, for any number of bidders n, there exist a set of mechanisms gk ∈ Gn,k
(k = 2n + 1, 2n + 2, ...) that incur a profit loss of O( 1
k2
). The profit loss is compared with
the optimal, individually-rational mechanism that is unconstrained in communication.
Proof. Consider the model where bidders consider their virtual valuations v˜i(vi) as their
valuations. As the range of the valuations in this model, we take the union of the ranges
of all the bidders’ virtual valuations. Denote this range as [α, β]. Let g˜ ∈ Gn,k be the
mechanism that achieves the maximal welfare in this model. Due to Theorem 5.1, g˜ incurs
a welfare loss smaller than c · 1
k2
, for some positive constant c (the constant takes into
account the size of the virtual valuations’ range β − α). Let g be the mechanism with the
same allocation as in g˜, only each payment q˜i for bidder i in g˜ is replaced with qi = v˜i
−1(q˜i)
in g, i.e., q˜i = v˜i(qi). Since each v˜i is non-decreasing (by their regularity), the allocation
rules in g and g˜ are identical for every bids’ combination. Thus, g achieves the maximal
expected virtual surplus, and the loss of expected virtual surplus is smaller than c · 1
k2
. The
proposition follows.
Again, this upper bound is asymptotically tight: with the uniform distribution, any
mechanism incurs a profit loss of Ω( 1
k2
). This result is derived from Theorem 5.2 using
similar arguments as in Proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.4. Assume that the bidders’ valuations are distributed uniformly. Then, for
any (fixed) number of bidders n, there exists a positive constant c such that any mechanism
g ∈ Gn,k incurs a profit loss ≥ c ·
1
k2
.
So far, we assumed that the bidders’ valuations are drawn from statistically indepen-
dent distributions. We now point out that the relaxation to general joint distributions is
non-interesting in our model. Specifically, we can show that the trivial priority game for
which all the bidders use the threshold strategy based on the vector x = (0, 1
k
, 2
k
, ..., k−1
k
, 1)
always incurs an expected welfare loss smaller than 1
k
, and no mechanism can do asymp-
totically better. In other words, there exists some joint distribution function for which any
mechanism incurs a welfare loss proportional to 1
k
.
5.3 Asymptotic Bounds for a Growing Number of Bidders
In this subsection, we fix the size of communication allowed (to two possible bids), and we
show asymptotic bounds as a function of the number of bidders rather than the amount
of communication. Unfortunately, we have been able to prove such bounds only for the
uniform distribution.
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When we restrict our attention to symmetric mechanisms, the solution is simple. Using
the threshold x = n−
1
n−1 (for all bidders) achieves the maximal expected welfare, and we
have the exact formula showing that the optimal welfare loss is O( logn
n
).21
We now show that optimal asymmetric mechanisms incur asymptotically smaller welfare
and profit losses of O( 1
n
). These mechanisms fully discriminate between the agents.
Theorem 5.5. Consider the mechanisms PG2(
−→x ) and MPG2(
−→y ) described in Corollary
4.3 (in Section 4.1). When the bidders’ valuations are distributed uniformly, both the welfare
loss in PG2(
−→x ) and the profit loss in MPG2(
−→y ) are smaller than ≤ 9
n
.
Proof. Let x be the revenue-optimizing thresholds from Corollary 4.3. We will bound the
welfare loss in PG2(x), the efficient mechanism will incur even a smaller loss. We assume,
w.l.o.g., that in g, bidders are indexed according to their priorities (i.e., 1 ≺ 2... ≺ n ).
When a bidder wins after bidding “1”, the maximal welfare loss is 1−xi. When all bidders
bid “0”, we use the trivial upper bound of 1 for the welfare loss . Therefore, we can bound
the welfare loss with:
n∑
i=1
 n∏
j=i+1
xj
 (1− xi) (1− xi) + n∏
i=1
xi (9)
The following two claims can be easily verified by induction:
Claim 5.6. ∀n 1− xn ≤
2
n
Claim 5.7. ∀n≥15 xn ≤ 2n−32n
Now, we prove by induction on n that the first summand in Equation 9 is ≤ 8
n
. Denote
this first term by wln. Note that wln+1 = (1− xn+1)
2 + xn+1wln. Assuming that wln ≤
8
n
,
and using the two claims above, it is easy to prove that wln+1 ≤
8
n+1 for n > 14. (the
reader can verify that this also holds for n ≤ 14.)
Next, we prove (again by induction on n) that the second expression is smaller than 1
n
.
We assume
∏n
i=1 xi ≤
1
n
and prove that
∏n+1
i=1 xi ≤
1
n+1 (using Claim 5.7 ) :
n+1∏
i=1
xi = xn+1
n∏
i=1
xi ≤ xn+1
1
n
≤
2n− 1
2n+ 2
·
1
n
<
2n− 1
2n+ 2
·
1
n
+
1
2n(n+ 1)
=
1
n+ 1
Thus, the expected welfare loss is smaller than 8
n
+ 1
n
= 9
n
The statement about the profit loss can be derived from the result about the welfare
loss (again, by reducing profit optimization to welfare optimization). Nevertheless, a direct
proof is easy given the above claims: with the same thresholds x from above, the profit
21. The expected welfare then is given by: xn · x
2
+ (1 − xn) · 1+x
2
. A maximum is achieved (first order
conditions) with: x = n−
1
n−1 . The welfare loss is thus: n
n+1
−
1
2

1− n−
1
n−1 ( 1
n
− 1)

( n
n+1
is the
maximal welfare with unbounded communication). It is easy to see that if 1−
 
1
n

1
n converges to log n
n
then the welfare loss also converges to log n
n
. And indeed, 1−
 
1
n

1
n = 1−e−
log n
n ≈
log n
n
(since 1−e−x ≈ x
for small x’s).
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B
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0 1
0 A, 0 B, 14
1 A, 13 B,
3
4
Figure 3: (h1) This sequential game (when A bids first) attains a higher expected welfare than
any simultaneous mechanism with the same communication requirement (2 bits). This
outcome is achieved with Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
loss is bounded from above by
∑n
i=1
(∏n
j=i+1 xj
)
· (1− xi) · (1− xi) that was proved to be
smaller than 8
n
.22
6. Sequential Auctions
In sequential mechanisms, bidders split their bids into smaller messages and send them
in an alternating order. In this section, we show that sequential mechanisms can achieve
better results. However, the additional gain (in the amount of communication) is only up
to a linear factor in the number of bidders.
A sequential mechanism is a mechanism in which each bidder may send several separate
messages, in some order (not necessarily in a round-robin fashion). At each stage, each
bidder knows what messages the other bidders have sent so far. After all the messages
are sent, the mechanism determines the allocation and payments. We study a general
framework where the auctioneer can adaptively determine the order of the messages and
their sizes according to the message history. The auctioneer can also use randomization in
its decisions. We measure the communication volume in a mechanism by the number of
bits actually transmitted.
Definition 16. The communication requirement of the mechanism is the maximal amount
of bits which may be transmitted by the bidders in this mechanism.
A strategy for a bidder in a sequential mechanism is a threshold strategy if in each stage
i of the game the bidder determines the message she sends by comparing her valuation to
some threshold values x1, ...xαi (where this bidder has αi + 1 possible bids in stage i).
Example 2. The following sequential mechanism has a communication requirement of 2
(see Figure 3 ): Alice sends one bit to the mechanism first. Bob, knowing Alice’s bid, also
sends one bit. When Alice bids 0: Bob wins if he bids 1 and pays 14 ; If he bids zero Alice
wins and pays zero. When Alice bids 1: Bob also wins when he bids 1, but now he pays 34 ;
If he bids zero, Alice wins again, but now she pays 13 .
It is easy to see that this mechanism has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium23 that achieves
an expected welfare of 0.653. We saw that the efficient simultaneous mechanism with a
22. In the priority games based on the thresholds −→y , if bidder i wins the item, he pays yi. Thus, the maximal
profit loss when bidder i wins is 1− yi.
23. The following strategies are in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: Alice uses the threshold 1
2
, and Bob uses the
threshold 1
4
when Alice bids 0 and 3
4
when Alice bids 1.
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communication requirement of 2 bits is 0.648 (see Section 1). We conclude that sequential
mechanisms can gain more efficiency than simultaneous mechanisms.
Note that throughout the paper we searched for optimal mechanisms among all the
mechanisms with Bayesian-Nash equilibria, but we managed to implement this optimum
in dominant strategy. In sequential mechanisms it is less likely to find dominant-strategy
implementations, thus our above example uses Bayesian-Nash implementation. Our re-
sult below, however, do not assume any particular equilibrium concept in the sequential
mechanisms.
How significant is the extra gain from sequential mechanisms over simultaneous mecha-
nisms? The following theorem states for every sequential mechanism with a communication
requirement of m there exists a simultaneous mechanism that achieves at least the same
welfare with a communication requirement of nm (where n is the number of bidders)24.
Note that in general (e.g., Kushilevitz & Nisan, 1997), multi-round protocols can reduce
the communication by an exponential factor. We observe that the gain from sequential
mechanism is actually even smaller. In many environments, all messages are sent to a cen-
tralized authority (auctioneer); therefore, extra bits of communication will be required to
inform the bidders about the previous messages of the other bidders. The following theorem
holds for any order of transmission and any size of the sub-messages, even if these values
are adaptively determined according to previous messages.
The goal of this section is to show that the gain from sequential auctions, compared
to simultaneous auctions, is mild. We do not offer a comprehensive analysis of this case,
not present welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions. Several recent papers
studied different aspects of sequential auctions with similar constraints. Sandholm and
Gilpin (2006) analyzed sequential auctions designed as sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers.
A paper by Kress and Boutilier (2004) studied sequential single-item auctions with discrete
price increment, where information can be used in subsequent stages. The work of Parkes
(2006) studied information elicitation in simultaneous and sequential auctions when the
values are uncertain.
First, we observe that we can assume that the welfare-maximizing strategies of the
bidders are threshold strategies. Again, we show that for each message chosen by bidder
i, the welfare is a linear function in vi. To show this we should use a backward-induction
argument: in the last message, the bidders will clearly use thresholds. Therefore, in previous
stages the welfare (as a function of vi fixing the strategies of all the other bidders) is a linear
combination of linear functions which is itself a linear function. The maximum over linear
function is a piecewise linear function and the thresholds will be its crossing points.
Theorem 6.1. Let h be an n-bidder sequential mechanism with a communication require-
ment m. Then, there exists a simultaneous mechanism g that achieves, with dominant
strategies, at least the same expected welfare as h, with a communication requirement smaller
than nm.
Proof. Consider an n-bidder mechanism h with a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, and with
communication requirement m (for simplicity, assume n divides m, i.e., each bidder sends
24. Note that in sequential mechanisms the bidders must be informed about the bits the other bidders sent
(we do not take this into account in our analysis), so the total gain in communication can be very mild.
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m
n
bits). There exists a profile s = (s1, ..., sn) of threshold strategies that achieves the
optimal welfare in h. First, we give an upper bound for the total number of thresholds
each bidder uses in the game. For a bidder i, let αi1, ..., α
i
ki
be the (positive) sizes of the ki
messages she sends in h. Let γij (1 ≤ j ≤ ki) be the number of bits that were sent by all
the bidders (including i), before bidder i sends his jth message. When choosing a message
of size αij , the bidder uses up to 2
αij − 1 thresholds. In each stage, every bidder can use a
different set of thresholds, for every possible history of the game. Thus, for sending her jth
message she can use up to 2γ
i
j
(
2α
i
j − 1
)
different thresholds. Summing up, bidder i uses
at most T (i) =
∑ki
j=1 2
γij
(
2α
i
j − 1
)
thresholds. Now, assume, w.l.o.g., that the bidders are
numbered according to the order they send their last messages (i.e., γ1k1 > γ
2
k2
> ... > γnkn).
Recall that the total number of bits sent by the bidders ism. When sending the last message,
bidder 1 thus uses 2
m−α1
k1
(
2
α1
k1 − 1
)
< 2m different thresholds. Since each messages have
a non-zero size, bidder 2 will have at most 2
m−1−α2
k2
(
2
α2
k2 − 1
)
< 2m−1 different thresholds
for the last stage. Similarly, every bidder i can use at most 2m−i+1 thresholds for his last
message. But therefore, for her before-last message bidder i uses at most 2m−i−1 different
thresholds (the worst case occurs when one bidder sends one bit between bidder i’s 2 last
messages). It follows that the maximal number of different thresholds for bidder i is:
T (i) =
ki∑
j=1
2γ
i
j
(
2α
i
j − 1
)
< 2m−i+1 + 2m−i−1 +
ki−2∑
j=1
2γ
i
j
(
2α
i
j − 1
)
< 2m−i+1 + 2m−i−1 +
m−i−2∑
j=1
2j < 2m−i+1 + 2m−i−1 + 2m−i−1 < 2m−i+2
Now, let g be a simultaneous mechanisms in which each bidder simply “informs” the
mechanism between which of the thresholds he uses in h his valuation lies. Clearly, for every
set of valuations of the bidders, this allocation in g and h is identical. Due to the inequality
above, m − i + 2 bits suffice for bidder i to express this number. We conclude that the
number of bits sent by all the bidders in g is smaller than:
∑n
i=1(m− i+2) = nm−
n(n−3)
2 .
Finally, we mention that we can set the allocation scheme and the payment scheme in
g such that the threshold-strategies based on the thresholds in s will be an equilibrium and
the expected welfare will not decrease. As shown in Section 3, we turn this mechanism to be
monotone by allocating the item deterministically to the bidder with the highest expected
value, in each combination of bids. A dominant-strategy equilibrium follows.
This analysis holds for any order and sizes of the bidder messages, even when they
depend on the history of the messages, since counting the number of thresholds can be still
done in the same way.
7. Future Work
This paper concerns single-item auctions that are severely limited in their ability to elicit
information from the bidders: only a few possible bids are available for each player although
each player may have a continuum of types. We give a comprehensive analysis of such
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auctions, and present welfare- and revenue-maximizing mechanisms under these restrictions.
We asymptotically analyze the losses in these optimal mechanisms compared to auctions
with unrestricted communication, and we also compare them to auctions where the bidders’
messages are sent sequentially.
We leave several questions open. The most obvious problem is the exact characterization
of the optimal mechanisms for an arbitrary number of players and an arbitrary number of
possible bids. This paper fully characterized the optimal 2-bidder k-bid auctions and the
optimal n-bidder 2-bid auctions, but only presented asymptotically optimal results for the
general case of n players and k bids. Also, future work may provide an asymptotic analysis
of the welfare- and the revenue loss as a function of both k and n (we provided a separate
asymptotic analysis by each of these variables).
An additional interesting question is regarding the gain from allocating the bits of com-
munication non-uniformly among the agents. While in simple domains (like 2-bidder simul-
taneous auctions) uniform distribution of the communication seems to be the best option,
this would be unclear, and probably untrue, in more general settings. In addition, it seems
that the concepts and methods presented in this work extend to more general frameworks,
like general single-parameter mechanism-design settings and mechanism design with inter-
dependent values (some extensions are given in the recent work by Blumrosen & Feldman,
2006).
Finally, this work presented a partial study of sequential auctions with communication
restrictions. This kind of auctions captures many reasonable real-life settings, and seems
to be analytically challenging. We did not present a characterization of the optimal se-
quential mechanisms in this paper, nor a direct comparison of simultaneous and sequential
mechanisms with the same communication requirement. Future work may also compare
prior-aware sequential mechanisms and “detail-free” sequential mechanisms (a similar com-
parison for simultaneous mechanisms showed that detail-free mechanism can only achieve
trivial results). Another possible extension would be to take an integrated approach and
study settings with partially-known priors.
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Appendix A. Missing proofs
In this section we present formal proofs for some of the results given in the body of the
paper.
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A.1 Optimality of Threshold Strategies
Proof of Claim 3.2 in Theorem 3.1:
Proof. Given a vector of strategies s∗ which achieve optimal welfare in g (i.e.,
max
es∈×ki=1ϕki w(g, s˜) ), we will show that for every player i we can modify s
∗
i to be a threshold
strategy, and the welfare will not decrease.
Assume s∗i is not a threshold strategy. Therefore, there must be α, β, γ ∈ [a, b], α < β <
γ such that s∗i (α) = s
∗
i (γ) = m but s
∗
i (β) 6= m (where m is some bid of player i). We will
show that a strategy vector s identical to s∗, except that for every such β si(β) = m, we
have that w(g, s) ≥ w(g, s∗).
Denote the probability that all players except i bids b−i as Pr(b−i). Thus, the expected
welfare from a game g given that bidder i with valuation vi bids m and that the other
players use strategies s∗−i is:
∑
b−i
Pr(b−i)
ai(m, b−i) · vi +∑
j 6=i
aj(m, b−i) · E(vj
∣∣s∗j(vj) = bj )

Note that this expected welfare is a linear function of vi, and we denote it by h(m) ·vi+
t(m) (the constants h(m) and t(m) depend on the bid m).
We know that s∗ achieve optimal welfare in g and that s∗i (α) = m. Therefore, there is
no other bid l such that if s∗i (α) = l, the expected welfare will increase, i.e.:
∀l 6= m h(m) · α+ t(m) ≥ h(l) · α+ t(l) (10)
Similarly, because s∗i (γ) = m:
∀l 6= m h(m) · γ + t(m) ≥ h(l) · γ + t(l) (11)
Because β is a convex combination of α and γ, and due to Equations 10 and 11:
∀l 6= m h(m) · β + t(m) ≥ h(l) · β + t(l)
Thus, the expected welfare for player i, given vi = β, is maximal when she bids m. There-
fore, when modifying s∗i such that s
∗
i (β) = m the total expected welfare will not decrease.
We can repeat this process until s∗i becomes a threshold strategy.
25
A.2 Optimal Mechanisms Use All the Possible Bids
Lemma A.1. wopt2,(k,k) > w
opt
2,(k−1,k) for every k > 1.
Proof. Let g ∈ G2,(k−1,k) be a deterministic, monotone mechanism that achieves the optimal
welfare with threshold strategies based on the vectors (x, y). Each row in g is of the form
[A, ..., A,B, ..., B], and let li ∈ {0, ..., k} be the first index in row i in which B wins. We will
modify g to g˜ ∈ G2,(k,k) by adding some missing row, and change the threshold strategy x to
x˜ ∈ ℜk+1, such that the welfare strictly improves. We assume, w.l.o.g., that the thresholds
are unique (i.e., 0 < x1 < ... < xk−1 < 1, 0 < y1 < ... < 1).
25. See analysis of similar problems, e.g., by Athey (2001).
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Case 1. The row [B, ..., B] is in the game’s matrix.
Let x
′
1 =
EvB (vB |0≤vB≤y1)
2 , and let x˜ = (0, x
′
1, x1, x2, ..., xk−2, 1). We will create a new
game g˜ by adding the line [B, ..., B] as the first line. It is easy to see that the allocation
in g and g˜ is identical in all rows except the new one. When vA ∈ [0, x
′
1] and vB ∈ [0, y1]
g˜ allocates the item to B where g allocated the item to A. The distribution functions are
always positive, hence this will occur with a positive probability. Since E(vA|vA ∈ [0, x
′
1]) <
x
′
1 < EvB (vB |0 ≤ vB ≤ y1), the expected welfare has strictly increased. For higher bids of
bidder B, the allocation in the first row will clearly be efficient now, therefore no welfare
loss was incurred.
Case 2. The row [B, ..., B] does not appear in g’s game matrix.
Due to the monotonicity, g must have two rows i and i+1 and two columns j and j+1
such that we allocate the item to B when the bids are (i, j), (i, j + 1) and to A when the
bids are (i+ 1, j), (i + 1, j + 1). We will create a mechanism g˜ by adding a row i′ identical
to row i+1 except that B wins in index j+1. The new threshold is constructed as follows:
If E(vB|yj ≤ vB ≤ yj+1) < xi+1:
Let x
′
i+1 = E(vB |yj ≤ vB ≤ yj+1), and let x˜ = (0, x1, ..., xi, x
′
i, xi+1, ..., 1). As in previous
cases, the welfare in all entries hasn’t changed, except a strictly positive improvement in
the (i′, j) entry.
If E(vB|yj ≤ vB ≤ yj+1) ≥ xi+1:
Let x
′
i = E(vB |yj+1 ≤ vB ≤ yj+2) and let x˜ = (0, x1, ..., xi, x
′
i, xi+1, ..., 1). We show that
since g is efficient xi+1 < x
′
i < xi+2: First, E(vB |yj+1 ≤ vB ≤ yj+2) > E(vB |yj ≤ vB ≤
yj+1) ≥ xi+1; Also, since A wins for the bids (i + 1, j + 1), we have E(vB |yj+1 ≤ vB ≤
yj+2) ≤ E(vA|xi+1 ≤ vA ≤ xi+2) < xi+2. It follows that the expected welfare has strictly
increased in the entry (i′, j + 1), and has not decreased in all other entries.
A.3 Optimal Symmetric 1-bit Mechanisms
Following are the optimal 1-bit 2-bidder mechanisms assuming independent uniform distri-
bution for all values. The socially-efficient symmetric 1-bit mechanism achieves an expected
welfare of 0.625 compared to 0.648 that is achieved in an asymmetric 1-bit mechanism and
2/3 that is achieved with unrestricted communication. Similarly, the revenue-maximizing
symmetric 1-bit mechanism below achieves an expected profit of 0.385 compared to 0.39 with
1-bit symmetric mechanisms and 5/12 = 0.417 with unrestricted communication (second-
price auction with a reserve price).
The following mechanism achieves the optimal welfare among all the symmetric 1-bit
mechanisms:
0 1
0 w.p. 12A wins, pays 0 B wins and pays
1
4
w.p. 12 B wins, pays 0
1 A wins and pays 14 w.p.
1
2 A wins, pays
1
2
w.p. 12 B wins, pays
1
2
Proving the social efficiency of the mechanism can be done by the following idea: First
note that a symmetric, efficient mechanism will clearly allocate the item to the player that
264
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
bids 1 when the other player bids 0, and allocate with equal probabilities of 12 when the
bids are equal. With threshold strategies (x, y) the expected welfare is:
w(x, y) = x · y ·
(
1
2 ·
x
2 +
1
2 ·
y
2
)
+ x · (1 − y) · (1+y)2 + (1 − x) · y ·
(1+x)
2 + (1 − x) · (1 − y) ·(
1
2 ·
(1+x)
2a +
1
2 ·
(1+y)
2
)
Maximum is achieved when (x, y) = (12 ,
1
2).
The mechanism below is the revenue-maximizing mechanism:
0 1
0 No allocation B wins and pays 1√
3
1 A wins, pays 1√
3
w.p. 12 A wins, pays
1√
3
w.p. 12 B wins, pays
1√
3
The idea behind the optimality of the above mechanism over all the 1-bit symmetric
mechanisms: in the profit-maximizing symmetric mechanism if a player bids 0 and the other
bids 1, the latter wins and pays x. When both players bid 1, they will pay x with equal
probabilities. It is easy to see that under the ex-post IR assumption, x = x. The expected
profit is thus: r(x) = x(1−x)x+(1−x)xx+(1−x)(1−x)(12 x+
1
2x). Maximum is achieved
(x ∈ [0, 1]) when x = 1√
3
.
References
Ajtai, M., Megiddo, N., &Waarts, O. (2001). Improved algorithms and analysis for secretary
problems and generalizations. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 14 (1), 1–27.
Athey, S. (2001). Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in
games of incomplete information. Econometrica, 69 (4), 861–89.
Bar-Yossef, Z., Hildrum, K., & Wu, F. (2002). Incentive-compatible online auctions for dig-
ital goods. In 13th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA),
pp. 964–970.
Bergemann, D., & Pesendorfer, M. (2001). Information structures in optimal auctions. Tech.
rep. 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Blumrosen, L., & Feldman, M. (2006). Implementation with a bounded action space. In
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pp. 62–71.
Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., & Steinberg, R. (2006). Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press.
David, E., Rogers, A., Schiff, J., Kraus, S., & Jennings, N. (2005). Optimal design of
English auctions with discrete bid levels. In The Sixth ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, pp. 98–107.
Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C. H., & Shenker, S. (2001). Sharing the cost of muliticast
transmissions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences., 63, 21–41.
Gilbert, J. P., & Mosteller, F. (1966). Recognizing the maximum of a sequence. Journal of
the American Statistical Association, 61, 35–73.
Goldberg, A. V., Hartline, J. D., & Wright, A. (2001). Competitive auctions and digital
goods. In Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 735–744.
265
Blumrosen, Nisan & Segal
Harstad, R. M., & Rothkopf, M. H. (1994). On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions.
European Journal of Operations Research, 4, 572–581.
Kress, A., & Boutilier, C. (2004). A study of limited precision, incremental elicitation in
auctions. In the 3rd international joint conference of autonomous agents and multi-
agent systems.
Kushilevitz, E., & Nisan, N. (1997). Communication Complexity. Cambridge University
Press.
Lavi, R., & Nisan, N. (2004). Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions.
Theoretical Computer Science., 310 (1), 159–180.
McAfee, P. (2002). Coarse matching. Econometrica, 70 (5), 2025–2034.
Mookherjee, D., & Reichelstein, S. (1992). Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian
incentive compatible allocation rules. Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (2), 378–399.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1),
58–73.
Nisan, N., & Segal, I. (2006). The communication requirements of efficient allocations and
supporting prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 129 (1), 192–224.
Parkes, D. C. (2005). Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathe-
matics and Artificial Intelligence, 44 (3), 269–302.
Parkes, D. C. (2006). Iterative combinatorial auctions. In Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., &
Steinberg, R. (Eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, chap. 2. MIT Press.
Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981). Optimal auctions. American Economic Review,
71 (3), 381–392.
Roth, A. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2002). Late-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-
price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon on the Internet. American Economic
Review, 92 (4), 1093–1103.
Rothkopf, M. H., Teisberg, T. J., & Kahn, E. P. (1990). Why are Vickrey auctions rare?.
Journal of Political Economy, 98 (1), 94–109.
Sandholm, T., & Gilpin, A. (2006). Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal
auctions without full valuation revelation. In Fifth International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 1127–1134.
Segal, I. (2003). Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand. American Economic
Review, 93 (3), 509–529.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal
of Finance, 16, 8–37.
Wilson, R. (1989). Efficient and competitive rationing. Econometrica, 57, 1–40.
266
